FROM 3RD TO 10TH DECEMBER 2021 ASGI CARRIED OUT ITS THIRD MISSION IN NIGER TO ANALYSE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY’S MIGRATION POLICIES[1].HERE ARE THE RESULTS OF THIS INVESTIGATION.
The bottleneck of Agadez
Since 2016, Niger has turned from the main hub for migrants moving between West and North Africa into a mobility bottleneck where migrants are often forced back to their countries of origin.
This is the result of massive financial and diplomatic interventions by the European Union and its Member States to create a dam upstream the so-called “Central Mediterranean route”. Thanks to these efforts, Niger has gradually become a leading country in the development of infrastructure and know-how for the management of the so-called “mixed flows” through resettlement programmes for (few) asylum seekers and support for the so-called voluntary return to (many) countries of origin.
More specifically, between 2014 and 2020, the EU used its Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTFA) to finance projects aimed at strengthening stability and targeting the root causes of emigration by investing €288.4 million in Niger[2]. Moreover, EU humanitarian aid to Niger reached €247.1 million between 2014 and 2020. The EU also used €716 million from the European Development Fund to cover the financing of the National Indicative Programme of Niger, including direct budgetary support[3].
Italy has been playing a primary role in the development of these activities. According to the results of a research project called “The Big Wall”, Italy spent over €99 million to support 32 different projects in Niger between 2015 and 2020. In October 2020 the Italian Foreign Ministry used €8 million from the “Migration Fund” to finance the Italian Migration Strategy in Niger which was developed with the United Nations agencies based in the country. The strategy is built around five pillars integrated with each other: protection and assistance to migrants and refugees; coexistence with local communities; fight against human smuggling; creation of work opportunities in migrants’ areas of origin; coordination of ongoing projects in Niger in the field of migration.
Italian financing remained constant over time and it followed the breakdown of funds indicated in the strategy, ranging from interventions to support the so-called voluntary return of migrants stuck in the country to interventions to support asylum seekers and to support border management by Nigerien authorities through training, to funds to build border crossing points and equip them with biometric verification tools, to the supply and provision of “non-lethal” material and equipment to strengthen the country’s border management capacities[4].
Moreover, the Bilateral Support Mission in Niger (MISIN), which has been operating since 2018, “envisages a gradual development through an average annual deployment of up to 295 military personnel, 160 land assets and 5 air assets” and it is the most important Italian military mission in sub-Saharan Africa. Its tasks include supporting the stabilisation of the region and strengthening the territorial control capacities of the Nigerien authorities and of the G5 Sahel countries (Niger, Mali, Mauritania, Chad and Burkina Faso), developing Nigerien security forces to step up the fight against illegal trafficking and security threats and “contributing to border and territory surveillance activities”. In the context of the mission, the Italian armed forces are engaged in training GAR-SI Sahel units (Groupes d’Action Rapide – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel), i.e. rapid intervention groups which have been created in key countries like Niger, Mauritania, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad[5] since 2016 thanks to a considerable contribution from the EU. The creation of these “flexible, mobile, versatile and self-sufficient” police units should make it possible to counter terrorist threats, organised crime and human smuggling by strengthening controls at key borders.
The European and Italian engagement seems to have achieved the proposed goals: the number of people crossing from Niger into Libya and, in part, into Algeria went down from 333,891 in 2016, to 43,380 in 2018.
To better understand the context that the Italian and European interventions helped to shape and became part of, it would be useful to take a step back and look from a broader perspective at the dynamics and changes that turned Niger, and especially Agadez, into a bottleneck.
Law No. 36 of 2015: unwelcome movement
As is well known, Niger – and particularly the region of Agadez – are historically a transit area for people travelling from West Africa to North African countries – mainly Libya and Algeria – or intending to cross the Mediterranean into Europe. After the loss of a credible Libyan interlocutor capable of controlling the territory, the European Union turned to the Nigerien government in order to strengthen its “border management” capacities. And Niger became so important that it was dubbed “Europe’s southern frontier”.
One of the first steps taken by the Nigerien government to strengthen its control over the territory was the adoption of specific legislation aimed at fighting migrant smuggling, namely Law No. 36 of May 2015. This law raises several critical issues, both in its wording and in its implementation. First of all, the law punishes not only those who – intentionally and for personal gain – facilitate irregular entry into Niger, but also those who ensure the illegal exit from the country, although this conduct is not defined in any provision or elsewhere. This helps us understand the importance attached to controlling border crossings into North African countries, i.e. borders of interest for the EU. Several interviewees stated that they had the impression that the law was applied only in Agadez, which has become Niger’s northern border. As explained in detail in a feature article on the topic, the implementation of this law caused a sudden change in how people transited through this town, although their transit was considered legal and in fact one of the main sources of revenue for this town and region until the day before the law came into effect.
The implementation of the law had indeed significant consequences on the mobility of foreigners – including the citizens of ECOWAS Member States who should enjoy the right of free movement – even outside the Agadez region. Checkpoints multiplied on the main thoroughfares in Niger in order to deter migrants from West African countries from travelling northwards. The main result was certainly to drastically restrain transit in the Agadez region. Actually, although transit has never really stopped, the way of travelling has drastically changed with more migrants turning to smuggling services and consequently increased risks for people on the move.
READ THE FEATURE ARTICLE ON LAW 2015-36 AND ITS EFFECTS IN THE AGADEZ REGION
IOM transit centres: a short stop between unlawful deportation and a so-called voluntary return
Since 2014, by virtue of a verbal readmission agreement, of which there is no trace at the moment, Algeria has started returning to Niger not only Nigerien citizens residing without documents in Algeria, but also large numbers of citizens of West African countries, including people with visas or residence permits and people who never transited through Niger[6].
As is better explained in our feature article, the Algerian authorities take these people to a place in the desert generally referred to as “Point Zero”, around 15 kilometres from Assamaka. From here they have to walk to the nearest village and, as reported by Alarm Phone Sahara, it is not unusual for migrants to go missing or die in the desert.
Third-country nationals who arrive in Assamaka after being unlawfully deported are generally taken care of by IOM, but only those who decide to participate in the voluntary return programme receive medical care, assistance and accommodation. As is better explained in our feature article on voluntary returns, the services offered by OIM are the only services that migrants can access, so these people are in a way compelled to join the programme in order to have access to basic care and services.
The flow of third-country nationals from Algeria is thus mostly channelled through so-called voluntary return programmes that remove from the country those who do not have – or rather are deprived of – the resources to reattempt the journey to North African countries. Over the last few months, mass deportations from Libya to Niger seem to have increased, as reported by Alarm Phone Sahara’s field offices.
READ THE FEATURE ARTICLE ON VOLUNTARY RETURN PROGRAMMES
The Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) from Libya, protection tools and durable solutions: an interrupted journey.
In late 2017, UNHCR approved a plan to evacuate and resettle asylum seekers and refugees from Libya in order to ensure their access to protection and to so-called “durable solutions”. To this end the High Commissioner for Refugees signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Niger in December 2017, whereby Niger accepted to receive people evacuated from Libya in compliance with specific parameters, such as no more than 600 people being received at a time and each person remaining in the country for no more than six months. The MoU was extended in February 2020 for another two-year period. ETM is one of the very few tools implemented by international cooperation, and in particular by Italy, with the aim of mitigating the effects of blocked departures from Libya resulting in the first place from the implementation of a Memorandum between Italy and Libya. This plan became part of and fed the narrative of policies to block departures from Libya whereby “irregular” and uncontrolled migration along the central Mediterranean route was replaced by tools for a more orderly and well-managed mobility. The ETM and humanitarian assisted voluntary returns were indeed such tools. However, if on the one hand “humanitarian” returns lose their voluntary nature in the absence of alternative options and turn out to be “expulsions in disguise”[7], on the other the ETM is a sorely inadequate procedure in terms of numbers and completely deficient as regards both the substance of protection and procedural safeguards. Far from being a form of protection comparable to that offered in EU countries, it is an emergency tool, as the name itself suggests, and is subject to approval. EU and Italian politicians depicted the evacuation system in Niger as a sort of panacea for the protection needs of people stuck in Libya.
During its mission, ASGI’s delegation met numerous people participating in the ETM programme who had been stuck in Niamey for two or three years. Applications for resettlement to third countries are in many cases rejected by destination countries and the procedure does not provide for appeals against negative decisions or for States to give reasons for their rejections. This mechanism puts asylum seekers in a stalemate position with no clear ways out; while UNHCR may submit requests to different States, there are no definite deadlines and waiting can go on for several months. According to the Head of Mission of COOPI, an NGO cooperating with UNHCR in the management of the ETM, many applications for protection are rejected and destination states refuse to accept resettlement so that the project is shifting towards other “durable solutions”, including first and foremost integration in the transit country.
This same solution seems to be the only one offered to asylum seekers and refugees, mostly from Sudan, who have reached Niger independently, mainly from Libya, and find themselves stuck in the “humanitarian centre” in Agadez run by UNHCR in partnership with a local organisation. Although many asylum seekers and refugees in Agadez are convinced that they will be relocated, the UNHCR field officer clearly explained to ASGI’s delegation that only a very limited number of people will get relocated, while most of them will be expected to start an integration pathway in the country.
READ THE FEATURE ARTICLE ON ETM
The effects of forces in action. Perverse logics in an imaginary Niger
The emphasis placed on integration opportunities in Niger as a durable solution has also become part of Italy’s political and diplomatic discourse. In a brief conversation with ASGI’s delegation, the Italian Ambassador in Niger explained that it is now necessary to create development and employment opportunities in Niger and work with civil society in the country to ensure that these opportunities are shared with migrants who find themselves stuck in Niger either of their own free will or by force of circumstances. This goal is pursued by Italy mainly by financing projects aimed at eradicating “the root causes of emigration” and creating “substitute economies” to replace those based on transit migration.
In this respect it should be recalled that Niger is the lowest-ranking country in the United Nations’ Human Development Index for 2020. Migration policies implemented so far, especially in the Agadez region, have further worsened the precarious economic and social conditions of the population, whose income was mostly based on the need for transportation, rest and refreshment of migrants in transit through the desert.
In addition to that, the country is used to receiving forced influxes from Libya – in connection with ETM and unlawful deportations – and from Algeria. Niger’s geographical position and the accumulation of resources, infrastructure and know-how have created a self-perpetuating situation. The economic, social and political structures built and consolidated in Niger allow international organisations and players active in development cooperation to operate “with ease” irrespective of whether the implemented projects can effectively address the identified critical issues.
The adverse effects of a form of migration governance aiming solely at containing mobility are evident when reading the factual premises underlying the projects implemented by international organisations with European and Italian funds.
In introducing a project aimed at strengthening border management capacities of governments of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali[8], IOM reports that it noticed “an increase in human smuggling following the tightening of migration policies in the region (including Law 2015-36 in Niger that criminalised irregular migration through alternative routes in northern Niger)”. In the light of this situation, the project therefore aims at taking “additional measures to fight migrant smuggling along the Central Mediterranean route, including the strengthening of border control”.
This seems to perpetuate a cycle in which premises and responses are the same, i.e. border control and fight against what is referred to as “irregular” migration. It should also be noted that movements considered illegal and border control take place between countries part of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), whose founding principle and mandate is to defend and promote free movement across its member states, a right recognised to all the citizens of the region.
[1] Participants in ASGI’s mission from 3rd to 10th December 2021 were: Khalid Abaker, Amr Adem, Diletta Agresta, Luce Bonzano, Cristina Cecchini, Salvatore Fachile, Adelaide Massimi and Giulia Vicini. They split into two groups. Meetings and interviews with the following bodies were held by the first group in Niamey and by the second group in Agadez: National Eligibility Commission; Secrétariat Permanent du Cadre de Concertation sur la Migration; IOM; COOPI; UNHCR; Alarm Phone Sahara; Médecins du Monde (MDM); Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF); Committee of Former Migration Service Providers; International Rescue Committee (IRC); Association pour le bien-être (APBE); National Human Rights Commission –Resident Coordinator and UN Country Office Team in Agadez; International Red Cross; INTERSOS; Catholic Relief Service (CRS); Direction Générale de l’État Civil, des Migrations et des Réfugiés. Meetings were also held with lawyers, journalists and foreign nationals who were asylum seekers, refugees or undocumented residents. The feature articles published here were written by the mission participants and by Giulia Crescini, the scientific consultant for the project.
[2] Resources were allocated as follows: €120.4 million to governance; €87.1 million to employment, €54 million to migration management and €26.9 million to resilience.
[3] See Operationalization of the Pact – Action plans for strengthening comprehensive migration partnerships with priority countries of origin and transit. Draft Action Plan: Niger. Brussels, 20 September 2021, available at: https://www.statewatch.org/media/2766/eu-council-com-draft-action-plan-niger-migration-11950-21.pdf.
[4] For an overview of the projects financed by Italy between 2020 and 2021 and for more information on the Italian migration strategy for Niger, see https://sciabacaoruka.asgi.it/36041/ andhttps://sciabacaoruka.asgi.it/la-strategia-italiana-in-niger-per-la-gestione-delle-migrazioni/.
[5] The project to create these intervention groups was financed in 2016 with €74,175,338 from the EUTFA and it focuses on specific priority areas identified within the framework of the Joint Valletta Action Plan to fight the root causes of migration and to prevent “irregular” migration, human smuggling and trafficking.
[6] “The expulsions from Algeria to Niger (which make up for the majority of the migrants assisted with assisted voluntary return) continues in large numbers. Between 2016 and 2019, 27,153 migrants were expelled from Algeria to Niger. As a result of these high numbers of expulsions, IOM Niger was the largest ‘sending’ mission globally with more than 16,000 migrants assisted with AVR in 2019. In 2020 alone, despite the official closure of the land border between Algeria and Niger since 19 March 2020, more than 8,000 migrants were expelled. In 2021 thus far, almost 3,000 migrants were expelled since the end of February, as expulsions were temporarily halted during the electoral period in Niger.” See the Avenir Project, managed by IOM and financed by Italy with €1 million for one year at: https://sciabacaoruka.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/IOM-Niger-AVENIR-Project-Document-Work-Plan-and-Project-Budget-Annex-A-controfirmato.pdf.
[7] See the opinion of the International Protection of Human Rights Legal Clinic of the Roma 3 University retrievable at: http://protezioneinternazionale.giur.uniroma3.it/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Roma-Tre-IPHR-Legal-Clinic_CEDAW-Legal-Expert-Opinion_12042021.pdf.
[8] See the Project “Improving Border Management and Community Resilience towards Cross-Border Organized Crime in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso with a Focus on the Central Mediterranean Route”, retrievable at: https://sciabacaoruka.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Project-Proposal-Annex-A-IOM-Sahel_23.11firmato.pdf.
